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Abstract 
 
The study examines two components of metacognitive knowledge in the context of inquiry 
learning: metatask and metastrategic. Existing work on the topic has shown that adolescents often 
lacked metacognitive understanding necessary for optimal inquiry learning (Keselman & Kuhn, 
2002; Kuhn, 2002a; Kuhn, Black, Keselman, & Kaplan, 2000), but demonstrated that engagement 
with inquiry tasks may improve it (Keselman, 2003; Kuhn & Pearsall, 1998). 
The aim of the study is to investigate the gains in metacognitive knowledge that occur as a 
result of repeated engagement with an inquiry learning task, and to examine the relationship 
between metacognitive knowledge and performance on the task.  
The participants were 34 eighth grade pupils, who participated in a self-directed 
experimentation task using the FILE programme (Hulshof, Wilhelm, Beishuizen, & van Rijn, 
2005). The task required pupils to design and conduct experiments and to make inferences 
regarding the causal structure of a multivariable system. Pupils participated in four learning 
sessions over the course of one month. Metacognitive knowledge was assessed by the 
questionnaire before and after working in FILE.  
The results indicate that pupils improved in metacognitive knowledge following engagement 
with the task. However, many pupils showed insufficient metacognitive knowledge in the post-test 
and failed to apply newly achieved knowledge to the transfer task. Pupils who attained a higher 
level of metacognitive knowledge were more successful on the task than pupils who did not 
improve on metacognitive knowledge. A particular level of metacognitive understanding is a 
necessary, but not sufficient condition for successful performance on the task.  
 
Keywords: metacognitive knowledge, inquiry learning, inquiry skills, metacognitive skills, 
knowledge acquisition 
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Introduction 
 
The present study examined the relationship between metacognitive 
knowledge and strategic performance within the context of an inquiry learning 
domain. Inquiry learning, also called inductive learning by some authors 
(Beishuizen, Wilhelm, & Schimmel, 2004; De Jong & Van Joolingen, 1998; 
Veenman & Spaans, 2005; Veenman, Wilhelm, & Beishuizen, 2004; Wilhelm & 
Beishuizen, 2003), is defined as an educational activity in which learners 
investigate real or virtual phenomena and draw conclusions based on what they 
have learned regarding the causal status of the features in a multivariable system 
(Kuhn, Black, Keselman, & Kaplan, 2000). In a typical inquiry learning task, 
learners participate in the whole scientific inquiry cycle, from formulating 
investigative questions and stating hypotheses, through experimentation and 
validation of evidence, to making causal inferences and re-building theories. 
Learners typically direct their own investigatory activities and conduct experiments 
in the absence of instruction or explicit feedback regarding the accuracy of their 
conclusions or the validity of their approaches to the task. However, learners may 
be prompted by a researcher to formulate investigative intent, express their 
expectations, or draw and justify conclusions (Kuhn, Garcia-Milà, Zohar, & 
Andersen, 1995). Through engagement with inquiry learning tasks that resemble 
real scientific research in its simplest, generic form, learners construct and expand 
their understanding of the scientific content, while at the same time developing 
inquiry skills and an understanding of the nature of scientific knowledge and 
scientific thinking (Ben-David & Zohar, 2009; Kuhn, 2001, 2002a, 2002b). 
Due to the complexity of the inquiry learning task, and its qualities that require 
learners to take a systematic and reflexive approach in order to draw accurate and 
valid conclusions, inquiry learning is a domain in which metacognition is especially 
important. In most conceptualisations of metacognition, a distinction is usually 
made between metacognitive knowledge and the regulation of cognition (Brown, 
1978; Schraw & Dennison, 1994). 
Metacognitive knowledge refers to memory-retrieved declarative knowledge 
about the interplay between person, task and strategy characteristics (Flavell, 1979). 
It can be retrieved from long-term memory as a result of a purposeful and 
deliberate search, but may also be activated unintentionally based on cues present 
in the learning situation (Efklides, 2006). 
Unlike declarative metacognitive knowledge, the regulation of cognition is the 
procedural component of metacognition, often referred to as metacognitive skills 
(Veenman, 2011). These skills pertain to the deliberate use of a person's procedural 
knowledge for monitoring, guiding and regulating one's learning activity and 
problem-solving. These skills have a built-in feedback mechanism (Veenman, Van 
Hout-Wolters, & Afflerbach, 2006) and are amenable to practice and 
automatization (Veenman & Elshout, 1999).  
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In the context of inquiry learning, two components of metacognitive 
knowledge are especially relevant: knowledge of task objectives (metatask) and 
knowledge of strategies (metastrategic) (Kuhn, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002b; Kuhn & 
Pearsall, 1998).  
The metatask component relates to an understanding of the nature and 
requirements of the task, i.e. knowledge of task features and demands that call for 
the use of a particular strategy. In an inquiry learning task, metatask understanding 
refers to representation of the task objective as one of identifying the causal 
structures of the investigated phenomena and examining the effects of individual 
variables.  
The metastrategic component refers to an understanding of the strategies 
available in one's repertoire of strategies that are potentially applicable to the task 
and that are likely to succeed in achieving the task objective. As such, it involves 
both declarative knowledge of potential strategies and the conditions for their use. 
In the context of inquiry learning, where a control-of-variables strategy (CVS) has a 
central role, metastrategic knowledge includes recognizing the necessity for a 
control-of-variables strategy if the resulting causal inferences are to be valid, as 
well as recognizing the inadequacy of other invalid experimentation strategies. 
In Kuhn's (1999, 2001, 2002b) conception, meta-level knowledge is 
procedural and operates in the real selection and regulation of the use of inquiry 
strategies. Indeed, in order to emphasize the procedural nature of the meta-level, 
Kuhn actually used the term 'metastrategic knowing' instead of 'knowledge' in most 
of her work (Kuhn, 1999, 2001, 2002b). Although this meta-level is distinct from 
the performance level at which the actual exercise of strategies occurs, the changes 
at the performance level are determined and mediated by the meta-level of thinking 
(Kuhn et al., 1995, 2000; Kuhn & Pearsall, 1998). While meta-level knowledge is 
governing the selection and application of strategies, feedback from the 
performance level also informs the meta-level and leads to enhanced meta-level 
awareness and understanding of the task purpose and the strategies. This increased 
understanding at the meta-level guides subsequent improved strategy selection and 
gradually leads to changes in the distribution of the strategies observed at the 
performance level in a continuous cycle in which the meta-level both guides and is 
modified by the performance level (Kuhn, 2001, 2002a, 2002b, 2005; Kuhn & 
Pearsall, 1998). 
Zohar and Ben David (2008) and Zohar (2012) analysed Kuhn's conception of 
metastrategic knowledge in relation to other relevant conceptions in the field. They 
claimed that this concept addresses "the when, why and how" of using a thinking 
strategy, which corresponds to what Flavell termed knowledge about tasks and 
knowledge about strategies (Flavell, Miller, & Miller, 2002). Kuhn's conception is 
similarly related to Schaw's categories of procedural and conditional metacognitive 
knowledge (Schaw, 1998; Schaw & Dennison, 1994). However, Veenman (2011) 
opposed such a conception and claimed that metacognitive knowledge 
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encompasses only declarative knowledge and (declarative) conditional knowledge 
about the utility of strategies, but not the actual use of those strategies. The same 
author argued that Kuhn's notion of metastrategic knowledge actually obscures the 
boundary between metacognitive knowledge and skills.  
Although a prerequisite for successful performance on the task, activation of 
metacognitive knowledge does not necessarily lead to appropriate strategic 
response to the task and is not sufficient for mastery in strategic performance, partly 
because metacognitive knowledge may be incorrect or incomplete (Efklides, 2009; 
Veenman, 2011). Furthermore, even having adequate metatask and metastrategic 
understanding does not necessarily ensure the adequate execution of an appropriate 
strategy (Veenman, 2011, 2012). Metacognitive knowledge, being declarative in 
nature, cannot be readily applied on task processing (Efklides, 2009). Instead, 
procedural knowledge, i.e. the presence of metacognitive skills, is necessary for the 
adequate execution of appropriate strategies (Veenman et al., 2004). In an inquiry 
learning task, it is possible that the pupil knows that it is necessary to use a control-
of-variables strategy, but fails to apply it if he/she lacks the motivation or 
procedural knowledge about how to execute these strategies and how to monitor 
and regulate their application. As a result, Veenman (2011, 2012) concluded that 
metacognitive knowledge often poorly predicts learning outcome, and has no effect 
on behaviour until it is actually being used. 
Nevertheless, the importance of metacognitive knowledge is reflected in the 
fact that it directs the interpretation of a learning situation and task demands and 
provides a database from which the learner can retrieve information about which 
strategies to apply for the control and regulation of learning in a particular task 
(Efklides, 2006, 2009). This suggests that metacognitive knowledge can control 
strategic performance indirectly through expectations that influence the 
interpretation of situational and task demands (Efklides, 2009).  
Previous research in the field of inquiry learning consistently demonstrates 
that pupils experience problems in every phase of the scientific inquiry cycle and 
suggests that their difficulties are not limited to performance level, but extend into 
the area of meta-level understanding and the explicit management of one's strategic 
performance (Keselman, 2003; Keselman & Kuhn, 2002; Kuhn et al., 2000; Zohar 
& Peled, 2008). Although learners lack the metacognitive understanding necessary 
for optimal inquiry learning at the beginning of the learning process, microgenetic 
studies have demonstrated that pupils show improvement in inquiry skills and 
metacognitive functioning when they have an opportunity to participate repeatedly 
in situations that demand the application of these skills, even without direct 
instruction and with no feedback beyond that provided by the pupils' own activity 
(Kuhn, 1995, 2001, 2002a; Schauble, 1990, 1996).  
The present study is focused on metacognitive knowledge and the extent to 
which it is influential in inquiry learning task performance. The definition of 
metacognitive knowledge used in the study addresses both metatask and 
Ristić Dedić, Z.: 
Metacognitive Knowledge, Inquiry Skills, and Knowledge Acquisition 
119 
metastrategic components in the context of a control-of-variables strategy and 
accepts the notion of its declarative nature up to the point at which it is used for the 
management and regulation of one's learning process. 
The study examined the manner in which metacognitive knowledge is 
acquired and used for guiding the learning process in an educational context that 
otherwise provided only scarce opportunities for pupils' participation in inquiry 
tasks, and in self-directed experimentation tasks in particular. 
The relevance of the examination of metacognitive knowledge lies also in the 
observation that, in the domain of inquiry learning, metacognitive knowledge is of 
importance in its own right. Indeed, it is a key educational objective in science 
education related to the development of an understanding of scientific methods and 
processes of scientific knowledge acquisition.  
One of the goals in the current work was to investigate the gains in 
metacognitive knowledge that occur as a result of pupils' repeated engagement with 
an inquiry learning task. It was expected that initial levels of metacognitive 
understanding would be low due to pupils' lack of experience in dealing with 
inquiry learning tasks, but that they would improve significantly. Another goal was 
to examine the role of metacognitive knowledge in the process of knowledge 
acquisition and in the development of inquiry and metacognitive skills. To do so, 
we examined whether pupils who acquired higher metacognitive knowledge during 
inquiry learning process were more successful: a) at the metacognitive level, in 
planning and organising the activities on the task, b) at the performance level, in the 
use of the control-of-variables strategy, c) in making valid inferences regarding the 
(non)causal status of independent variables in the system, and d) in the acquisition 
of knowledge about the system, reflected in correct conclusions about its causal 
structure.  
 
 
Method 
 
Participants 
 
Participants were 34 eighth grade pupils from two primary schools in Zagreb 
that were chosen purposefully. The selection of participants was based on 
purposive (maximum variation) sampling (Patton, 1990), with the aim of selecting 
a heterogeneous group of pupils by purposefully picking a wide range of variation 
on dimensions of interest for the topic of inquiry learning. The participants were 
selected from a whole cohort of 114 pupils based on: cognitive abilities (inductive 
reasoning measured by TN-10, Pogačnik, 1997), self-reported Interest for science 
PSYCHOLOGICAL TOPICS 23 (2014), 1, 115-141 
 
120 
measure1
 
 (Ristić Dedić, 2010) and gender. The participating pupils covered a 
relatively broad range on intelligence and interest for science measures. The 
distribution of gender was also balanced.  
The Task 
 
The task used in the study was a self-directed experimentation task in the 
domain of biology. The content of the task was specifically designed for the 
purposes of the study. The task was loosely related to the sixth grade curriculum for 
the subject Nature, in that it was based on its topic "Benefits of forests, forest 
devastation and protection" (MZOS, 2006). It was not assumed, however, that the 
variables used in the task were covered in detail during regular teaching hours or 
that classroom teaching was based on the principles of inquiry learning. By 
choosing task content that was thematically connected to curriculum content, it was 
ensured that participants were at least partially acquainted to the theme and that 
they had some prior theories about the examined variables and their effects.  
The task was presented in a computer-supported environment using the FILE 
software (Flexible Inquiry Learning Environment, Hulshof, Wilhelm, Beishuizen, 
& van Rijn, 2005; Wilhelm, Beishuizen, & Van Rijn, 2005) that was translated and 
adapted for the purposes of the study. The interface of the "Forest Devastation" task 
in FILE is presented in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1. The Interface of the FILE Task "Forest Devastation" 
 
 
                                                 
1 The Interest for science scale assessed pupils’ interest in science in general and 
included items such as I would like o be a scientist, I like reading about science topics, 
Carrying out experiments is fun etc. The split on the scale was based on the median 
score. On the intelligence test the split was based on a division of results into thirds.  
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The task required participants to design and conduct experiments and to make 
inferences regarding the causal structure of a multivariable causal system. The task 
presented five independent variables with discrete levels or categories and one 
dependent variable. The participants conducted experiments by choosing and 
varying the levels of independent variables and observing the effects on the 
dependent variable. By doing so, the participants were in a position to make 
inferences about the relationships between independent and dependent variables. 
The task of the participants in the study was to determine if and how the 
independent variables affected forest devastation. The dependant variable was 
measured on a scale from 1-5 (1 – very low level of forest devastation to 5 – very 
high level). Independent variables were: 1) type of forest (deciduous or evergreen), 
2) configuration of the land (lowland or hills), 3) distance from a settlement (close 
or far), 4) frequency of acid rain (rarely, often, and very often) and 5) presence of 
blight (yes or no).  
The model underlining the relationships between independent variables and 
the dependent variable was such that:  
a) Two variables ('configuration of the land' and 'distance from settlement') 
had no effect on the outcome),  
b) Two variables ('presence of blight' and 'type of forest') were causal, but 
they interacted with one another: at one level of the first variable, both 
categories of the second interacting variable yield an identical result, while 
at the second level of the variable, there is a difference between the two 
categories of the second variable. 
c) One variable had a curvilinear effect: two levels of the variable 'frequency 
of acid rain' result in the same outcome value, while the third level yields a 
different result.  
Tasks of the same structure (i.e., same number of variables and types of 
relationships between variables) have been used in several studies examining 
inquiry learning amongst pupils in primary schools (e.g. Keselman, 2003; Kuhn & 
Katz, 2009; Kuhn & Pearsall, 1998; Kuhn et al., 1995, 2000; Kuhn, Pease, & 
Wirkala, 2009; Veenman & Spaans, 2005; Veenman et al., 2004; Wilhelm & 
Beishuizen, 2003). 
The choice of variables for the task model was based on a pretest examination 
with another group of eighth grade pupils in another school. It was important to 
ensure that the proposed variables and relationships between variables were 
plausible to participants, and that the task causal model corresponded to possible 
real-life phenomena. In the pretest, prior theories of pupils were tested in order to 
construct the task in a way that the task causal model supported and challenged 
prior causal and non-causal theories of the majority of pupils. 
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Procedure 
 
An introductory group meeting was organised with participants to demonstrate 
the FILE program. Participants were told that the study examined how primary 
school pupils solved one computer-supported task that might help them develop 
thinking skills. Participants were introduced to the FILE program through a task 
about a boy named Peter who is late for school. This task, which had the same 
interface and structure as the "Forest Devastation" task, has been previously applied 
in several studies (e.g. Hulshof, 2001; Wilhelm & Beishuizen, 2003). The process 
of conducting the experiments in FILE was demonstrated to participants by 
conducting two random experiments (uncontrolled comparison). Special attention 
was paid not to point to or suggest correct or valid strategies for working on the 
task. Participants were told that learners have to find out about relationships 
between presented features and Peter's arrival time at school. 
Following this demonstration, a metacognitive knowledge questionnaire was 
applied. 
After this introductory group meeting, all other sessions were individual. All 
participants performed the FILE task during regular school time. In order to track 
changes in the processes of inquiry skill development and knowledge acquisition, 
the "Forest Devastation" task was applied in four learning sessions over the course 
of one month. 
Full description of the task interface and the procedure applied for conducting 
the experiments is provided in Ristić Dedić (2010). The task required participants 
to actively engage in various stages of inquiry processes: from investigation intent, 
through hypothesis generation, experiment design and prediction of outcome, to 
validating evidence and making inferences.  
The "Forest Devastation" task was presented to participants in the context of a 
story about a group of researchers who are working on a forest protection project. 
The participants were given the task of helping researchers by finding out the level 
of forest devastation in relation to features identified as having possible effects. The 
participants were told that they had to find which features do or do not have an 
influence on forest devastation. 
During the learning sessions, participants autonomously made decisions about 
the features examined in each experiment, the order and the total number of 
experiments per session.  
Participants were additionally instructed to think aloud during the process of 
inquiry. Web-camera, digital recorder as well as computer log-files were used to 
record participants' activities on the task. The researcher also asked questions 
before, during and after each conducted experiment. The questions were the 
following: a) before each experiment: What do you want to find out now? How will 
you do it?; b) after choosing the features: What do you expect to find out?; c) after 
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inspecting the outcome: What did you find out? How did it go? / What can you 
conclude about the effect of the features? / How do you know?  
At the end of each learning session, participants were asked to express their 
theories regarding the effects of each feature. After the final learning session, the 
metacognitive knowledge questionnaire was applied again. 
 
Instruments/Measures 
 
1. Metacognitive Knowledge Questionnaire 
 
The metacognitive knowledge questionnaire was applied twice, following 
introductory meeting and immediately after the final learning session. This paper-
and-pencil measure of metatask and metastrategic knowledge was developed 
specifically for the purposes of the study, but was based on measures and 
procedures used by Keselman (2003) and Kuhn and Pearsall (1998). 
The questionnaire had two sections:  
a) Understanding of task goals and strategies 
In the first section, metacognitive knowledge was assessed through two direct 
measures (open-ended questions) that were framed as an imaginary conversation 
between the pupil and another class colleague. In this scenario, the participant was 
asked to explain their conceptions about the task goal and strategies needed to meet 
the goal for the task introduced to participants at the beginning of the study: 
Imagine the following situation: "You talk to your colleague in another class 
about what we did during our meeting. You explain that you are going to 
participate in the study by working on a computer task. Your colleague is 
asking you…". 
What do you need to do on the task? What is the goal here, what do you need 
to achieve? (Question examining participants' understanding of task goal). 
How do you decide which features to choose for each line (experiment) to 
solve the task successfully? (Question examining the inquiry approach 
participants deemed appropriate for meeting the task goal). 
In the second application of the questionnaire, the introductory scenario was 
changed slightly, but the questions regarding task goal and strategies remained the 
same: 
Throughout the research, you developed some research skills and learned 
something about how to run experiments. Now, you are likely in a position to 
share your knowledge with other class colleagues. Please recall what you did 
on the task and imagine a situation in which you have to show the task to your 
colleagues and teach them how to solve it.  
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Coding of the Responses  
The coding scheme developed by Kuhn and Pearsall (1998) was used for the 
coding of participants' responses to these questions examining metatask and 
metastrategic knowledge. While these two components were coded separately, 
levels of attainment for each component were conceptually equated across 
components (e.g. Level 1 in both components denoted an orientation towards 
positive outcomes). Table 1 presents these coding schemes.  
 
Table 1. Metatask and Metastrategic Levels (Adapted from Kuhn and Pearsall, 1998) 
 
Le
ve
l Metatask Metastrategic 
Description of the 
level 
Typical  
response 
Description of the 
level 
Typical  
response 
0 
No insight into the 
goal of the task, 
procedural 
description  
Select the little 
images and click on 
"result" button 
No awareness of the 
need for a strategic 
approach (Procedural 
description) 
Select whatever you 
like, You click on the 
little images  
1 
Orientation towards 
attainment of positive 
outcome 
Help Peter to arrive 
at school on time 
Choosing instances 
believed to yield a 
positive outcome 
Select icons 
according to how 
these things could 
help Peter to be fast 
2 
Analysis at instance 
level (Find out the 
result for different 
combinations of 
features) 
Examine how late 
Peter would be in 
different cases 
Choosing different 
instances to observe 
outcomes 
Try different 
combinations and 
check the results 
3 
Analysis at feature 
level, but without its 
isolation 
(Find out which 
features are making a 
difference in 
outcome) 
Find out what 
influences how much 
Peter would be late/ 
uncover the reasons 
for Peter's delayed 
arrival to school  
- - 
4 
Analysis at feature 
level with reference 
to multiple features  
(Find out whether 
features 1,2 and 3 are 
making a difference) 
Find out what 
difference is made 
when Peter makes 
choices (type of 
shoes, if he is having 
breakfast, how he 
goes to school, etc.) 
Comparing instances 
in an uncontrolled 
fashion (multiple 
features are varied) 
Compare how late 
Peter is depending 
on what he chooses 
e.g. what kind of 
breakfast he had, 
how he went to 
school, etc.  
5 
Analysis at feature 
level with focus on 
single feature at a 
time 
(Find out whether 
feature 1 is making a 
difference) 
Find out how each 
feature influences the 
time when Peter 
arrives at school  
Comparing instances 
in which a single 
feature is varied and 
other features are not 
mentioned 
Compare when Peter 
gets to school using a 
running bike or city 
bike  
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Table 1. - Continued 
Le
ve
l Metatask Metastrategic 
Description of the 
level 
Typical  
response 
Description of the 
level 
Typical  
response 
6 - - 
Comparing instances 
in which a single 
feature is varied and 
other features are 
held constant 
Change just one 
element e.g., types of 
shoes, to be able to 
conclude if it makes a 
difference  
 
The participants' responses were double coded to check inter-rater reliability. 
Cohen Kappa coefficients ranged between .79 and .94, and indicated acceptably 
high values in comparison to benchmarks set by Landis and Koch (1977). 
Percentage agreements between the two coders were between 85.3% and 97.1%.  
b) Application of metacognitive knowledge 
The second section of the questionnaire tested the application of metacognitive 
knowledge on the "Peter" task. As this task had the same structure as the main 
"Forest Devastation" task but was different in content, it acted as a transfer measure 
of metacognitive knowledge. 
Participants had to evaluate the strategies applied to the task by two imaginary 
pupils who are working together on the task. In this scenario, the pupils disagree 
about how to design the second experiment and which features to select for the 
combination of independent variables. The first pupil suggests using a combination 
that enables a valid comparison with the first experiment (i.e., corresponds to the 
control-of-variables strategy), while the second pupil suggests using a combination 
that corresponds to the invalid experimentation strategy 'Hold one thing constant at 
a time'. 
The following format was used:  
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Figure 2. The Transfer Task 
 
 
 
The participants had to decide which proposal is better and why (in the form 
of a response to an open-ended question). They also had to determine what could 
be revealed about the causal status of features if they followed Ana's or Nick's 
proposal. These questions examined participants' understanding of the value of 
control-of-variables strategies for making inferences about relationships between 
variables. They also indirectly assessed participants' understanding of the goal of 
the task as an inquiry task. 
The coding scheme applied to the responses in this section was developed in 
an exploratory (inductive) manner, based on the collected participants' responses. 
For responses regarding the participants' preferred proposal, the following scheme 
was used: 
0 – No explanation 
1 – Non-analytic response/ theoretic explanation (Peter should not hurry to 
school, it might be dangerous for him)  
2 – Dominance of participants' theories over evidence: (Participants preferred 
proposal that has more favourable combination of features, according to 
participants' theories / Participants did not show preference because in their 
opionion both proposals bring similar result or some other combination of 
features was favoured) 
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3 – Understanding of the value of CVS.  
The coding scheme applied to responses to the question What could you find 
out if you followed Ana's/Nick's proposal? was the following: 
1 – Correct (Whether feature X influences the result or not – when CVS was 
used; Nothing – when CVS was not used)  
0 – Incorrect.  
 
2. Task Performance 
 
Task performance was measured through a set of related, but separate 
measures of inquiry skills, metacognitive skills applied to the task and acquired 
knowledge about the causal model. 
 
Inquiry Skills 
Two measures of participants' inquiry skills for performing the task were used: 
1. Experimentation Skills: Usage of a control-of-variables strategy. As the key 
strategy for valid experimentation, usage of CVS represents a crucial measure of 
inquiry skills. When pupils use this strategy, they vary only one variable per 
experiment, which enables them to make a valid inference about the effect of this 
variable. The measure has also been used by some authors (Veenman et al., 2004) 
as a measure of metacognitive skilfulness, where varying more than one variable at 
a time represents poor systematic behaviour and a lack of experimental control.  
The use of CVS was determined using the average number of independent 
variables changed per experiment in each learning session. This measure was 
calculated automatically through analysis of the computer logfiles of each learning 
session. 
2. Validity of Inferences. This measure was based on an analysis of verbal 
protocols regarding participants' responses to the question "What have you found 
out?", posed by the researcher after each experiment, along with the inspection of 
experimental data in computer logfiles that documented participants' choice of 
independent variables in each experiment. Statements regarding the relationship 
between each independent variable and forest devastation were coded as valid 
when a controlled comparison of two experiments was followed by a correct 
conclusion regarding the causal status of the only uncontrolled independent 
variable and the justification of the inference made reference to the evidence. If 
there was no evidence of a controlled comparison in the produced data set, or if 
participants interpreted the evidence incorrectly, the inferences were coded as 
invalid. 
For each learning session, the percentage of valid inferences with respect to 
the total number of inferences made during the session was calculated.  
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Twenty percent of participants' responses were double coded in a test of inter-
rater reliability. Cohen Kappas were between .90 and .98, and the percent 
agreement was between 96.9% and 99.2% (depending on independent variable).  
 
Metacognitive Skills: Plan and Organisation of Inquiry Activity  
For each learning session, participants' verbal protocols were reviewed to 
determine the level of plan and organisation of inquiry activity during task 
performance. The dominant level of plan and organisation achieved at each 
learning session was coded as follows (based on Schauble, 1996):  
1. General plan, when participants' experimentation reflected the existence of 
a plan that took into account the whole structure of the problem. These global plans 
guided participants in generating evidence throughout the experimentation process 
and resulted in systematically organised data sets. 
2. Partially organised activity, when there was evidence for a guiding plan 
that helped participants run several experiments in a row, but these plans were 
abandoned or forgotten before their completion.  
3. Local chaining, when participants showed the tendency to compare pairs of 
experiments in isolation, without being aware of the wider structure of the problem.  
4. No plan, when participants ran experiments in an order that did not seem 
logical and when they did not express any sign of planning activity, even at the 
level of individual experiment.  
 
Acquired Knowledge About the Causal Structure of the Task Model 
Acquired knowledge was assessed based on the "theory interview" held at the 
end of each learning session, which probed participants' theories on the 
relationships between variables. For each independent variable, the following 
questions were posed to participants: Does feature X have an effect on the level of 
forest devastation? and How does feature X affect the outcome?  
Participants' answers were compared to correct statements about the effects of 
independent variables. Two points were awarded to a completely correct response, 
and zero points were awarded to false or non-existant answers. One point was 
awarded to a partially correct answer, which was possible in the case of three 
independent variables (where frequency of acid rain had a non-linear relation to the 
dependent variable, and the type of forest and presence of blight had a main and 
interacting effect on the dependant variable). Based on the scores received for each 
independent variable, a composite measure of acquired knowledge was constructed 
as the sum of points gained for each variable, with scores ranging from 0 to 10. 
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Results 
 
Changes in Metacognitive Knowledge Related to Repeated Engagement with an 
Inquiry Learning Task 
 
As previously mentioned, the present study examined change in metacognitive 
knowledge through both metatask and metastrategic components. Pupils' 
understanding of the task objective and of the strategies needed to accomplish the 
task was tested twice: before the first learning session and after the fourth session. 
Table 2 presents levels of attainment for the metatask and metastrategic 
components at these two measurement points (before - after). Both components 
represented pupils' responses to open-ended direct questions about the task goal and 
strategies. 
Due to the small number of participants and a violation of the assumption of a 
normal distribution of measures, differences between time points were analysed 
using non-parametric Wilcoxon sign tests. 
 
Table 2. Attained Levels of Metatask and Metastrategic Knowledge Before and After 
Engagement with the "Forest Devastation" Task: Number of Pupils at Each Level 
 
Metatask knowledge Pre N 
Post 
N 
0. No insight into the goal of the task  4 1 
1. Orientation towards attainment of positive outcome 18 1 
2. Analysis at instance level 3 1 
3. Analysis at feature level, but without its isolation 9 13 
4. Analysis at feature level with reference to multiple features  0 14 
5. Analysis at feature level with focus on a single feature at a time 0 4 
Metastrategic knowledge   
0. No awareness of the need for a strategic approach 20 16 
1. Choosing instances believed to yield a positive outcome 14 0 
2. Choosing different instances to observe outcomes 0 6 
4. Comparing instances in an uncontrolled fashion 0 0 
5. Comparing instances in which a single feature is varied and other 
features are not mentioned 0 6 
6. Comparing instances in which a single feature is varied and other 
features are held constant 0 6 
 
Metatask Knowledge  
 
Prior to engaging with the "Forest Devastation" task, pupils demonstrated low 
metatask knowledge. For the majority of participants (18, or 53%), the stated goal 
of the task was to achieve a positive outcome (level 1). However, the responses of a 
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substantial portion of participants (9, or 26%) could be classified as level 3 (the 
highest achieved level at this point of measurement), a level characterized by the 
intent to investigate the impact of various combination of features to Peter's 
tardiness. At this level, pupils recognized that the aim of the task was to discover 
the impact of features, but talked about them in a general way without the intent to 
single out the effects of individual features.  
After the fourth learning session, only three participants achieved the lowest 
levels of metatask knowledge (0 to 2), while the majority of pupils (27, or 79%) 
achieved levels 3 and 4. At these levels, participants recognized that the task goal 
was to analyse which features lead to which outcome, but conceptually were not 
focused on the need to analyze the effect of each individual feature. The highest 
level (level 5), characterized by a focus on analysis at the level of an individual 
feature, was achieved by only four participants (11%). 
The observed advancement in metatask knowledge following engagement 
with the task was statistically significant (T=16.89, z=-4.39, p<.001, r=.53)2
 
. 
Metastrategic Knowledge 
 
Prior to engaging with the task, metastrategic knowledge was even lower than 
metatask knowledge, with no pupils demonstrating metastrategic knowledge above 
level 1. Most participants (20, or 59%) exhibited no insight into the need for some 
form of strategic approach. Typical responses at this 0 level were: "You can select 
an icon randomly" or "You just click on the icon". Responses at level 1, evident in 
14, or 41% of pupils, were related to the search for a positive outcome.  
However, pupils demonstrated significant progress in metastrategic 
knowledge  following  engagement  with  the  "Forest  Devastation"  task  (T=4.05, 
z=-3.54, p<.001, r=.43).  
In the second application of the questionnaire, a significant proportion of 
students (12, or 35%) achieved the highest level of metastrategic knowledge, which 
is characterized by an understanding of the need for controlled comparison by 
varying one feature at a time (in order to determine the effect of this feature). Still, 
a large number of participants (16, or nearly 50%) remained at the lowest levels. 
 
Metacognitive Knowledge on a Transfer Task  
 
Table 3 presents pupils' responses on the metacognitive knowledge transfer 
task ("Peter task") before and after engaging with the "Forest Devastation" task. In 
                                                 
2 Because non-parametric tests generally have less statistical power than their parametric 
counterparts, the indicator of effect size (Pearson correlation coefficients) was also used.  
These coefficients were calculated according to the formulas in Field (2005). For the 
interpretation of effect size, Cohen's (1992) recommendations were used. 
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this task, pupils were exposed to two different proposals - experimentation plans. 
They were then asked to identify which proposal is better and why (metastrategic 
knowledge), and to explain what one can find out by following these alternative 
plans (metatask knowledge).  
 
Table 3. Number of Pupils Who Selected Each Proposal for Experimentation in the  
Peter Task - Before and After Engagement with the "Forest Devastation" Task 
 
Transfer task Pre N 
Post 
N 
Chose valid experimentation proposal  
    (Adequate explanation) 
11 
(2) 
11 
(3) 
Chose invalid experimentation proposal 9 7 
Claimed that both proposals are equally appropriate 2 10 
Claimed that none of the proposals are appropriate 10 5 
Don't know/No answer 2 1 
 
Prior to engaging with the "Forest Devastation" task, a proposal that included 
a valid experimentation strategy was selected by 11 pupils (32%), while an 
alternative proposal was selected by slightly fewer pupils (9, or 26%). However, 
pupils' explanations of their responses revealed that only two pupils chose a valid 
proposal with an understanding of the value of controlled comparison, where they 
demonstrated highly developed metastrategic knowledge. Furthermore, these pupils 
demonstrated their metatask understanding by making appropriate conclusions 
about what could be achieved by following each proposal. They correctly reported 
that, by using uncontrolled comparison, no valid conclusion could be made, while 
controlled comparison might lead to a conclusion about the effect of the varied 
feature on Peter's arrival time.  
Other pupils explained their choice based on the claim that their preferred 
proposal presented a more favorable combination of features or the combination 
that would enable Peter to arrive to school on time. The same argumentation was 
used by pupils who chose the opposite proposal (which used an invalid 
experimentation strategy) and by pupils who selected the answer 'both/none of the 
proposals are good'. These responses demonstrated that these pupils were not able 
to expand their focus beyond a consideration of experiment outcomes (although the 
actual outcomes were not even provided). This focus is further demonstrated by 
answers given to the questions regarding what pupils could discover if they 
followed each experimentation plan: We would find out that Peter will be more/less 
late and He would have arrived faster if he had chosen some other features. 
After four learning sessions, only 11 pupils (32%) selected a valid 
experimentation proposal. Of these, only three participants made a valid 
argumentation of their choice based on the usage of CVS in their selected proposal.  
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The remaining pupils who considered the valid experimentation proposal to be 
better (8 of 11) were not aware of the fact that this was the only procedure that 
allowed for a valid causal inference and backed up their selection by the claim that 
this proposal presents a "better" combination of features (according to their 
expectations). 
The selection of opposing proposals, made by seven pupils (21%), was 
explained using the same claims. A conceptually identical explanation was also 
given by pupils who claimed that both proposals were equally good and by pupils 
who claimed that no proposal was good. These pupils stated that both combinations 
of features led to similar results, or believed that some other combination of 
features would give a more favorable result. 
Changes in pupils' responses on the metacognitive transfer task before and 
after engaging with the "Forest Devastation" task was measured using a marginal 
homogeneity test, which indicated no statistically significant values (MHM=25.5, 
Std. MH=.367, p=.71). 
 
Metacognitive Knowledge and Performance on the "Forest Devastation" Task  
 
In order to examine the relationship between metacognitive knowledge and 
performance on the task, a derived measure of metacognitive knowledge was used 
instead of separate measures of metatask and metastrategic components, as 
proposed by Kuhn and Pearsall (1998)3
The relationships between metacognitive knowledge and performance were 
tested in two situations: metacognitive knowledge as exhibited in the first 
application of the questionnaire was related to task performance in the first learning 
session, while metacognitive knowledge in the second questionnaire application 
was related to task performance in the fourth learning session.  
. This derived measure used the highest 
value exhibited by a pupil in either metatask or metastrategic component. As such, 
the range for this new measure was between level 0 (for pupils that achieved the 
lowest level in both components of metacognitive knowledge) and 6 (for pupils 
who achieved this level within the metastrategic component). 
 
Metacognitive Knowledge and Task Performance in the First Learning Session 
 
Prior to engaging with the "Forest Devastation" task, the achieved range of the 
new derived measure of metacognitive knowledge was between 0 and 3. To test 
differences in task performance between groups of pupils who achieved different 
                                                 
3 These authors argued that a joint measure of metacognitive knowledge represents a 
more appropriate measure than individual measures of each component, due to the fact 
that the assessment method is verbal and might underestimate the actual level of 
metacognitive understanding held by pupils.  
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levels of metacognitive knowledge, pupils were divided into two groups: lower 
(levels 0 and 1) and higher (levels 2 and 3) metacognitive knowledge.  
Mann-Whitney tests were used to test the differences between these two 
groups in their use of CVS, the validity of their inferences and the accuracy of their 
theories, while a chi square test was used to test differences in the 
planning/organization of inquiry activity. 
Table 4 presents the results of these tests as well as central values for measures 
of task performance during the first learning session for groups of pupils with lower 
and higher levels of metacognitive knowledge.  
 
Table 4. Median Values (C) of Measures of Strategic Performance in the First  
Learning Session, Grouped According to Level of Metacognitive Knowledge (MK) 
 Attained Before Engagement with the Task 
 
Strategic performance: 1st session 
Lower MK 
(Levels 0-1) 
N=22 
Higher MK 
(Levels 2-3) 
N=12 
Sig. 
Average number of features changed per 
experiment 2.39 2.26 
U=127.50 
p=.87 
r=.03 
Percentage of valid inference 44.44 43.33 
U=124.50 
p=.79 
r=.05 
Accuracy of theories on the relation 
between IVs and DV 5.00 6.00 
U=97.50 
p=.21 
r=.22 
 
 
Table 5 presents the results examining group differences in the application of 
metacognitive skills of planning and organising the inquiry activity. 
 
Table 5. Number of Pupils Using Each Type of Plan in the First Learning Session,  
Grouped According to Level of Metacognitive Knowledge (MK)  
Attained Before Engagement With the Task 
 
Metacognitive skills 
Lower MK 
(Levels 0-1) 
N=22 
Higher MK 
(Levels 2-3) 
N=12 
Sig. 
General plan 2 0 χ2=6.71  
df=3  
p=.08 
φ=.444
Partially organised activity 
 
5 5 
Local chaining 8 7 
No plan 7 0 
 
                                                 
4 Here the effect size measure is Cramer's V of Phi. 
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In the first learning session, no statistically significant differences were 
observed between the lower and higher metacognitive knowledge groups in 
strategic performance. The difference observed in planning and organisation of 
inquiry activity was also not statistically significant. However, a Phi value of .44 
suggests a medium to higher effect size in the direction of a more highly planned 
and organised experimentation process for the group of pupils that achieved higher 
levels of metacognitive knowledge. 
 
Metacognitive Knowledge and Task Performance in the Last Learning Session 
 
Following engagement with the task, pupils were allocated to levels from 2 to 
6 on the joint measure of metacognitive knowledge. Pupils were divided into three 
groups with respect to the attained level of metacognitive knowledge: low (2 or 3), 
medium (4) and high (5 or 6). The values on measures of task performance for 
these groups during the final learning session are shown in Table 6 and Table 7. 
Here, only the differences between the extreme groups (low and high) in the 
use of CVS, validity of inferences, accuracy of pupils' theories, and the level of 
plan and organisation of inquiry activity were tested. This decision was justified by 
the small number of participants and the corresponding low statistical power of 
tests, and by an intent to alleviate the effects of multiple comparisons between 
groups. 
 
Table 6. Median Values (C) of Measures of Strategic Performance in the Last  
Learning Session, Grouped According to Levels of Metacognitive Knowledge (MK) 
Attained After Engagement With the Task 
 
Strategic performance: 4th 
session 
Low MK 
(Levels 2-3) 
N=13 
Medium MK 
(Level 4) 
N=7 
High MK 
(Levels 5-6) 
N=14 
Sig. (extreme 
group 
comparison) 
Average number of features 
changed per experiment 2.11 1.85 1.81 
U=40.00 
p=.01  
r=.48 
Percentage of valid inference 54.17 66.67 80.56 
U=48.00 
p=.04  
r=.40 
Accuracy of theories on 
relation between IVs and DV 8.00 10.00 9.07 
U=54.00 
p=.07  
r=.35 
 
The results of Mann-Whitney tests revealed statistically significant differences 
in the use of CVS and the validity of inferences, while the differences in the 
accuracy of pupils' theories about the relationships between variables were not 
statistically significant, but suggested a medium size effect. The group of pupils 
who attained high levels of metacognitive knowledge after engagement with the 
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task experimented more systematically, made more valid inferences and acquired 
more knowledge about the causal structure of the task than the group that remained 
at a low level of metacognitive knowledge.  
 
Table 7. Number of Pupils Using Each Type of Plan in the Last Learning Session,  
Grouped According to the Level of Metacognitive Knowledge (MK)  
Attained After Engagement With the Task 
 
Metacognitive skills 
Low MK 
(Levels 2-3) 
N=13 
Medium 
MK 
(Level 4) 
N=7 
High MK 
(Levels 5-6) 
N=14 
Sig. (extreme 
groups 
comparison) 
General plan 4 4 6 χ2=1.12  
df=2  
p=.57 
φ=.20 
Partially organised activity 5 2 6 
Local chaining 4 0 2 
No plan 0 1 0 
 
A Chi square test for the difference between the low and the high 
metacognitive knowledge groups in the planning and organisation of inquiry 
activity revealed no statistically significant difference, but a small effect size.  
 
 
Discussion  
 
The first question raised in this study focused on changes in metacognitive 
knowledge following repeated engagement with an inquiry learning task. 
The data presented here suggest that pupils demonstrated improvement in 
metatask and metastrategic knowledge after four learning sessions within the FILE 
system. This finding is consistent with other microgenetic studies of inquiry 
learning (Kuhn et al., 1992, 1995; Schauble, 1990, 1996), which also demonstrated 
that the participation of pupils in repeated learning sessions that required self-
directed experimentation is sufficient (even without specific feedback) for inducing 
changes at the strategic and meta-levels.  
Prior to engaging in the "Forest Devastation" task, pupils' understanding of the 
nature and requirements of the task, as well as their understanding of the strategies 
that are applicable to the task, proved to be quite insufficient. This suggests that an 
understanding of the task requirements could be expected and facilitated only when 
pupils started working on the task, where they gained direct experience in 
experimentation and making causal inferences.  
With direct and repeated experience working on the inquiry learning task, 
pupils' understanding of the task changed from one oriented towards achieving a 
positive outcome to one aimed at exploring the effects of individual features. Pupils 
also demonstrated improvement in their understanding of the strategies applicable 
to the task. A significant number of pupils acquired an understanding of the 
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appropriateness of the control-of-variables strategy for responding to the task goals. 
However, nearly half of the pupils continued to demonstrate insufficient 
metastrategic understanding at post-test and remained at the lowest level, indicating 
an inability to formulate any strategic approach or to recognize the need for such an 
approach. Overall, greater progress in metatask knowledge (when compared to 
metastrategic knowledge) might be the result of the possibility that questions posed 
by the researcher during pupils' work and interviews provided more cues for 
gaining an understanding of the task goal than for gaining an understanding of the 
strategies applicable to the task. Alternatively, this difference might also be the 
result of the possibility that metastrategic knowledge is existent, but not completely 
explicit. For pupils, it might be easier to reach insights into and explicate what is 
necessary to accomplish in an inquiry learning task than to find out how to achieve 
that goal. 
The data further suggest that pupils mostly failed to apply newly achieved 
metacognitive knowledge to the transfer "Peter task". In this task, where pupils 
were asked to apply metacognitive knowledge to a concrete example, no 
advancement in metatask and metastrategic knowledge was observed. Instead, 
where pupils were required to demonstrate their understanding of the task goals and 
to explain why a control-of-variables strategy is the optimal strategy for achieving 
the goal of identifying the effects of individual features, pupils demonstrated a 
tendency to regress to a level that represents the engineering approach to 
experimentation (Schauble, Klopfer, & Raghavan, 1991), i.e., an approach that 
aims at determining the optimal combination of features that lead to the desirable 
outcome. Obviously, pupils did not recognize the applicability of the previously 
acquired valid inquiry strategies, despite the fact that the transfer task used an 
identical task model (with different content) and required the same type of activities 
that had already been used on the main task. According to the measures applied, 
only three pupils had sufficiently developed metatask and metastrategic knowledge 
that enabled the application of this knowledge to new learning situations. These 
findings are in contrast with the results related to improvement in metatask and 
metastrategic knowledge observed through direct questioning. The fact that 
metacognitive knowledge gained through engagement with the "Forest 
Devastation" task could not be applied in the context of a parallel transfer task 
suggests that metacognitive gains were fragile and restricted only to the immediate 
learning situation. These findings also imply that, while mere repeated engagement 
in experimentation activity can improve meta-level competency, "stronger" 
interventions are probably needed for transfer to a variety of contexts.  
Arguably, transfer was limited by the fact that the content of the task was from 
the daily life domain, which is the domain (together with the social domain) that is 
particularly problematic for the establishment of valid experimentation and 
reasoning approaches, mainly because of difficulties in coordinating the 
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experimental evidence with the extremely rich and elaborate theories of pupils 
(Kuhn & Pearsall, 1998; Kuhn et al., 1995). 
Results of other studies also point to the limited transfer of metacognitive 
understanding, even when some interventions for building metacognitive 
knowledge were applied (Keselman, 2003; Keselman & Kuhn, 2002; Kuhn et al., 
2000; Zohar & Ben David, 2008). These studies suggest that, in order to ensure 
higher and universal metacognitive gains and to secure successful transfer to new 
learning situations, more sustained practice and the direct instruction of (meta-
level) strategies in a variety of contexts is needed.  
Arguably, pupils did not demonstrate improved metacognitive understanding 
on the transfer task in part because of the way in which this task was structured. In 
this task, two fictional pupils disagreed over how to carry out a second experiment. 
In the "Forest Devastation" task, pupils often began their experimentation by 
setting the combination that would result in a minimal outcome (even when they 
understood that CVS was necessary) because they would like this "minimum 
combination" to serve as a reference point for comparison with other experiments. 
On the transfer task, it seems plausible that pupils did not recognize the need to 
create a second experiment in a manner that would allow for a valid comparison 
with the first experiment, but instead believed that it was first necessary to establish 
the optimal combination of features. Bearing this in mind, it is possible to assume 
that, although pupils might have had general understanding of the need to examine 
the effect of individual features, the presentation of only the first two experiments 
did not encourage pupils to think in a valid way. If this assumption is correct, it is 
likely that pupils, regardless of their initial unfavorable result on the transfer task, 
would likely advance faster (in relation to the "Forest Devastation" task) if they 
were given the opportunity to experiment with a new content task. While this study 
did not allow for an examination of this assumption, other studies have suggested 
such a possibility (Kuhn et al., 1992, 1995). 
The second question raised in the present study focused on the relationship 
between metacognitive knowledge and task performance. It was assumed that 
successful strategic performance would be impossible without an understanding of 
the task goal as one of analyzing the effects of individual features and without an 
awareness of the need for varying features in the experiments in a way that would 
allow for valid inference making (Kuhn, 1999, 2002a, 2002b). 
The data presented in this study suggest that groups of pupils who achieved 
lower and higher levels of metacognitive knowledge prior to actual engagement 
with the "Forest Devastation" task did not differ with respect to task performance 
during the first learning session. In this session, both groups changed a similar 
number of features per experiment, made an equal percentage of valid conclusions 
and acquired the same level of knowledge about the causal model. This finding, 
indicative of an absence of a relationship between metacognitive knowledge and 
task performance might be attributed to three issues. Firstly, initial low levels of 
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metacognitive knowledge among all participants (the highest level achieved by any 
pupil was 3) might represent equally inappropriate mental frameworks for initiating 
inquiry activities, irrespective of the metacognitive level achieved. Secondly, 
achieved metacognitive knowledge prior to actual engagement with the task might 
be viewed as a reflection of pupils' declarative knowledge that was based on a 
superficial familiarisation with the task content and procedures, but not on their 
own experiences and reflections of that experience. It might be argued that true 
metacognitive understanding can only be facilitated by actual experimentation and 
the application of cognitive and metacognitive skills and that metacognitive 
knowledge measured prior to such activities was not an accurate reflection of actual 
understanding. Finally, due to verbal mediation and a question format that gives 
pupils freedom in deciding how to respond, it is possible that the paper-and-pencil 
measure of metacognitive knowledge underestimated pupils' true level of 
understanding.  
However, the data does indicate that pupils who achieved higher levels of 
metacognitive knowledge prior to actual engagement with the task were somewhat 
more organised and systematic when it came to actual execution of the inquiry 
activity. This observed relationship between metacognitive knowledge and applied 
metacognitive skills suggests that higher metacognitive knowledge is likely to lead 
to more appropriate (meta)strategic responses by providing input for making 
decisions about which strategic approach to apply to the task.  
A slightly different relationship between metacognitive knowledge and 
strategic performance was observed for the last learning session. Here, the group of 
pupils with high metacognitive knowledge (measured after engagement with the 
task) performed better on the task than the group of pupils who did not improve on 
the metacognitive knowledge measure. However, these groups were quite similar in 
terms of the experimentation plan and organisation of the learning activity in the 
last session. 
The data further suggest that even achievement of the highest levels of 
metacognitive knowledge (levels 5 and 6) did not guarantee strategic success, as 
some of the pupils who reached a high metacognitive level did not use valid 
strategies consistently. This finding confirms Kuhn and Pearsall's observation 
(1998) that a particular level of metacognitive knowledge is a necessary, but not 
sufficient condition for successful performance on the task. Pupils might know that 
the task goal is to determine the effects of individual features and might understand 
the need for systematic and strategic action, but still might conduct experiments in 
an unorganised and unsystematic way. It might be argued that the reasons for not 
applying metacognitive knowledge might be related to motivation (e.g., the task 
might be boring or irrelevant to pupils, while it requires an investment of effort), 
strategic deficits (pupils might lack the inquiry skills necessary for adequate 
execution of activities), or metacognitive flaws (pupils' skills in planning, 
monitoring, evaluation and control of the learning process might be 
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underdeveloped). Future research efforts should further examine the interacting 
relationships between these elements and attempt to determine causality in these 
relationships. 
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